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I. INTRODUCTION
Widening an existing split among the circuit courts, the Eleventh Circuit
held that a federal district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a petition
to compel arbitration under Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) if
the underlying dispute to be arbitrated itself states a federal question.' By
holding that federal question jurisdiction exists and extends over the entire
case, the court has allowed out-of-state banks to sidestep the regulations of
state usury laws and has provided a weapon to the predatory-lending
industry's arsenal.
II. CASE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 6, 2004, the respondent-appellee James E. Strong visited a
"payday loan" store, Georgia Cash America, a Georgia corporation, and took
out a payday loan for two hundred dollars ($200), which he agreed to repay
by March 3, 2004.2 The loan agreement Mr. Strong entered into was similar
to many other payday loans, which characteristically are for small amounts
of money, must be repaid within a few weeks, and carry a high interest rate. 3
The promissory note stipulated that the contract involved interstate
commerce and was subject to the FAA. The note provided that the
respondent-appellee's signing of the note served as an acknowledgement that
any disputes related to the loan would be resolved by binding arbitration. 4
Georgia's usury laws align with the laws of several other states by
banning such high interest payday loans, and clearly prohibit a Georgia bank
from extending these loans to Georgia residents.5 The involvement of out-of-
state banks complicates the matter, because Section 27 of the Federal
Depository Insurance Act (FDIA) expressly permits state-chartered, FDIC-
insured banks to extend the interest rates of the state in which the bank is
chartered to customers outside that state.6 In spite of any Georgia law that
expressly bans high-interest payday loans, an out-of-state bank is allowed to
* Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 485 F.3d 597 (11 th Cir. 2007).
iCmty. State Bank v. Strong, 485 F.3d 597, 600 (1 1th Cir. 2007).
2 Id. at 601.
3 Id. at 600. The loan Mr. Strong entered into carried a finance charge equivalent to
an annual interest rate of 252.7%. Id. at 601.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 600.
6 See 12 U.S.C. § 183 1d(a) (2000).
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charge Georgia residents any rate, so long as the rate is permitted by the law
of the state in which the bank is chartered. 7
The state of the law is murky when an out-of-state bank partners with an
in-state payday loan store to market the bank's loans to persons within the
state in which the loan store sits. Georgia Cash America, the Georgia
corporation whose store Mr. Strong visited to procure his loan, is an affiliate
of petitioner-appellants Cash America Financial Services, Inc., and Cash
America International, Inc., corporations incorporated in Delaware and
Texas, respectively. 8 Together, these companies market, service, and collect
payday loans on behalf of petitioner Community State Bank (the bank), an
FDIC-insured bank chartered by the state of South Dakota.9 The note
identified the bank as the lender, and stipulated that although the bank
partnered with the Cash America companies to service the loan, the Cash
America companies were not owned by, operated by, or affiliated with the
bank and had no authority to make loans. 10
Instead of repaying the loan, Mr. Strong filed suit in Georgia state court
against defendants Georgia Cash America, Cash America International, and
Daniel Feehan, the Chief Executive Officer of the Cash America
corporations."l The state court complaint set forth six causes of actions, all
essentially alleging that the loan was unenforceable because it was
usurious. 12 Strong argued that the bank had very limited actual involvement
in the loan and that the Cash America companies were the real lenders. 13
Strong alleged Cash America's partnership with Community State Bank was
a deceptive act, undertaken solely to side-step Georgia's usury laws. 14
Regarding the arbitration provision, in his complaint Strong argued the
provision was unenforceable and unconscionable. 15 Strong's complaint
specifically set forth several other arguments-presumably to prevent the
removal of the case to federal court-including that the complaint did not
raise any federal causes of action, did not state any causes of action against
any bank, and did not seek recovery in excess of $75,000.16
7 See id.




12 Id. at 601-02.
13 Id. at 602.
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After the filing of Mr. Strong's state court action, the defendants in the
state case responded by serving Strong with a Notice of Intent to Arbitrate
pursuant to the terms of the loan agreement. 17 The state-action-defendants'
letter to Mr. Strong stated that the loan was lawful. 18 The letter averred that
the bank was the true lender, that none of the Cash America companies was
the lender, and therefore that the interest rate charged for the loan was
governed and allowed by federal law. 19 The arbitration notice demanded that
Mr. Strong dismiss his state court action and participate in binding
arbitration. 20 In a letter in response to the arbitration notice, Mr. Strong
reiterated his belief in the truth of the averments contained in his state court
complaint and informed the defendants that he intended to further pursue his
action in Georgia state court. 21
In the face of Mr. Strong's resistance to abandon his state court action,
his adversaries launched a two-pronged attack. First, the state-court
defendants removed the state court action to the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia, claiming that 12 U.S.C. § 1831d
completely preempts usury claims under Georgia state law.22 Upon a claim
that the district court had improperly granted removal, Mr. Strong moved the
court to remand the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.23
While Mr. Strong's motion to remand was pending, his opponents
moved-under the FAA-to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration of
Mr. Strong's claims. 24 Mr. Strong mounted an opposition to the defendants'
motion to compel arbitration, and Mr. Strong moved the court to grant
expedited discovery concerning the enforceability of the arbitration
agreement. 25
The district court granted the motion to remand the case to state court,
and in so doing held that 12 U.S.C. § 183 ld does not completely preempt the
Georgia usury law claims against the defendants. 26 The district court's grant










26 Cmty. State Bank, 485 F.3d at 602.
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complaint did not state a federal question, and consequently that removal was
improper.27
The second arm of the opposition's plan was unleashed when the state
court defendants-joined by the bank and Cash America Financial
Services--commenced the independent action, which was the root of the
appeal before the Eleventh Circuit Court.28 The petitioners filed a Verified
Petition to Compel Arbitration and Stay Judicial Proceedings under
Sections 3 and 4 of the FAA. 29 In their verified petition, the petitioners
alleged that the promissory note signed by Strong contained an arbitration
agreement, under which all disputes regarding the loan must be resolved
through binding arbitration; that the opposing sides disputed whether 12
U.S.C. § 183 1d or state law governs the loan; that Strong refused the demand
to arbitrate; and that Strong's refusal to arbitrate threatened the petitioners
with severe injury. 30 The petitioners claimed the district court had
jurisdiction pursuant to federal question jurisdiction. 31 The petitioners
asserted that in arbitration they would seek resolution of Strong's state-court
claims and a declaration that the loan is governed by 12 U.S.C. § 1831d and
therefore lawful. 32
Strong, in a motion in opposition to the independent FAA petition,
argued the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter.33 Strong
claimed the opposing parties were simply restating the claims of his state-
court complaint. 34 Strong argued that should the court rule that state usury
claims against state-chartered banks are completely preempted by federal
law, he had not raised any claims against any bank, and thus there was no
federal question contained in his state-court claims. 35 If the state-court
complaint did not present a federal question, Strong argued the district court
was without subject matter jurisdiction.36
The district court granted Strong's motion and held that there was no
federal question jurisdiction. 37 The district court dismissed the independent
27 Id. at 602-03.
2 8 Id. at 603.
2 9 Id.
30 Id. at 603-04.
31 Id. at 604.
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FAA petition to compel arbitration due to the court's lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter.38 Specifically, the district court held that 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831d does not completely preempt claims under Georgia's usury laws
against state-chartered banks, and even if it did, Strong's state-court
complaint set forth no claims against any bank.39
The petitioners then filed their appeal of the district court's order granting
the dismissal of its FAA petition to compel arbitration. 40
III. THE COURT'S HOLDING
Because the parties agreed that diversity jurisdiction was not present in
the case, the only issue for the Eleventh Circuit Court was whether the
district court had jurisdiction over the subject matter based on a federal
question.4 1 The court construed the law in its circuit to grant district courts
subject matter jurisdiction over FAA Section 4 petitions "if [the court] would
have subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute-to-be-arbitrated." 42 The
court held that it is appropriate for a district court to "look through" the
arbitration petition at the underlying dispute in order to determine whether
there is a federal question. 43
To arrive at its holding in Strong, the Eleventh Circuit said it was bound
to follow its own precedent, as announced in Tamiami Partners Ltd. ex rel.
Tamiami Development Corp. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida.44 In
Tamiami, the case posited to the court the question of whether federal
question jurisdiction existed over a dispute concerning an agreement that
incorporated the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). 45 The court held in
Tamiami that federal question jurisdiction exited over the petition to compel
arbitration under IGRA because the court would have subject matter
jurisdiction over the underlying dispute.46 A footnote in Tamiami analogized
the situation then before the court with the FAA, and said that federal
38 Cmty. State Bank, 485 F.3d at 604.
39 Id.
40 Id.
4 1 Id. at 605.
42 Id. at 606.
43 Id.
44 Cmty. State Bank, 485 F.3d at 606 (citing Tamiami Partners Ltd. ex rel. Tamiami
Dev. Corp., v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, 177 F.3d 1212 (1 1th Cir. 1999)).
45 Tamiami, 177 F.3d at 1222.
4 6 Id. at 1222-23.
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question jurisdiction under the FAA exists if the district court would have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the underlying claim to be arbitrated.47
This court declared it must look at the petitioners' statement of the
dispute to decide the issues before it.48 In deciding the present appeal, the
court criticized the district court for too easily concluding that the petitioners
sought to arbitrate the same claims as the respondent offered in its state-court
complaint.49 The court stated that its reading of the petitioners' petition to
compel arbitration showed that petitioners sought to arbitrate two disputes:
the state-court claims presented in the respondent's state-court complaint, and
the petitioner's affirmative claim that the loan is governed by federal law.50
"If either of these two disputes-to-be-arbitrated states a federal question, the
district court has subject matter jurisdiction over the petition to compel."51
The district court looked at only the issue of whether issues were present in
the petition distinct from issues contained in the state-court complaint, but
the circuit court looked at the petitioners' claim that federal law preempts
state usury law. 52
The next step in the circuit court's analysis involved the court "looking-
through" the claims to the underlying dispute in order to determine if the
underlying claims presented a federal question. 53 The court found there was a
federal question because the underlying facts in the case could have given
rise to a federal action under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), and that it did not matter that Strong chose not to
bring such an action but instead chose to assert only state law causes of
action. 54 Since the state-law claims and the federal declaratory judgment
arose from a common nucleus of operative fact, the court held that the
district court did have subject matter jurisdiction over the entire claim. 55
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
Writing a separate concurrence, Judge Marcus announced the many
reasons why he considers the effect of the majority holding (which he also
47 Id. at 1223 n.11.
48 Cmty. State Bank, 485 F.3d at 606.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 607.
51id.
52 See id
53 See id. at 607-08.
54 Cmty. State Bank, 485 F.3d at 612.
55 Id. at 612-13.
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authored) wrong or at least "ill-considered."56 Judge Marcus announced his
belief that the majority opinion is correct because Tamiami is binding on the
court, and that the rule is ripe for en banc review or review by the Supreme
Court.57
Several courts in various circuits are of the mindset that federal question
jurisdiction over an FAA Section 4 petition to compel arbitration is not
dependent on the nature of the underlying dispute to be arbitrated. 58 Contrary
to the holding in Strong, the better reading of Section 4 of the FAA is that the
statute's plain language forbids federal courts from adjudicating the merits of
the dispute to be arbitrated and allows them to rule on only the arbitrability
of the dispute by interpreting the parties' contract. Federal courts should hear
Section 4 petitions only if the parties are diverse. Even the author of the
majority opinion in Strong agrees that the majority opinion is not the best
interpretation of Section 4 of the FAA.
Marcus M Van Wey
56 Id. at 614 (Marcus, J., concurring).
57 Id. at 614-15.
58 See, e.g., Kasap v. Folger Nolan Fleming & Douglas, Inc., 166 F.3d 1243, 1246
(D.C. Cir. 1999); U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n ND v. Strand, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1141-45
(D. Or. 2002); Westmoreland Capital Corp. v. Findlay, 100 F.3d 263, 267-69 (2d Cir.
1996); Smith Barney, Inc., v. Sarver, 108 F.3d 92, 94 (6th Cir. 1997); Wisconsin v. Ho-
Chunk Nation, 463 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2006).
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